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| Ammonium
Nitrate Explosion in Ryongchon Train Station, North Korea - 22 April
2004 161 people killed and 1,300 people injured
On Thursday 22 April 2004, at 1210 hrs local time (0310 UCT), there was a large explosion at Ryongchon Station, Ryongchon County, North Phyongan Province. This accident occurred during shunting operations at the city railway station. Two train wagons carrying ammonium nitrate came into contact with a wagon containing fuel oil. Each wagon contained 40 MT of ammonium nitrate. This resulted in a massive explosion creating a large crater and leveling everything in a 500 m radius. According to the Government the explosives were enroute to a construction site for the Pakma-cheol san irrigation project. It was confirmed that the explosion killed
161 people (among the dead are 76 children whose school was levelled
in the blast) and injured approximately 1,300 people, 370 of which
were severely wounded. Ryongchon
County has a population of 123,200 people, of whom 27,000 live
in the county city. The blast obliterated the station and the immediate vicinity, causing damage within a radius of four kilometres. The explosion occurred as the children were on their way home for lunch. According to the most recent information from the DPRK's, some 1,300 people were injured and about 700 hospitalized due to the explosion. The Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC) has confirmed that some 1,850 homes were destroyed or totally damaged, while a further 6,360 have sustained partial damaged. The thousands left homeless due to the blast's damage have been provided with temporary shelter in schools and public buildings, or else they have been taken in by relatives and neighboursles s affected. Among the large number of public buildings damaged were schools, the county hospital, a factory and an agricultural college. With the hospital damaged by the explosion, most of the severely wounded were taken to the North Pyongan provincial hospital at Sinuiju near the Chinese border. Others were taken for treatment to Pyongbuk Hospital, Sanwon Hospital, Provincial Pediatrics Hospital, Maternity Hospital, and Sinuiju City Hospital. Federation delegates who visited the scene of the disaster reported a huge crater at the centre of the blast, and said the nearest surviving buildings had been scorched as though a fireball had swept through them. Some 40 per cent of this town of 27,000 people have been affected by disruptions to supplies of electricity and water supplies, and communications. Fires involving ammonium nitrate can release
toxic nitrogen oxides and ammonia. A fire involving ammonium nitrate
in an enclosed space could lead to an explosion. The exact cause of the accidents still remains unknown but it is surely related to the handling of the ammonium nitrate in the wagons. Ammonium nitrate, in solid or molten form or in solution, is a stable compound and generally is difficult to explode. Ammonium nitrate may explode, however, when exposed to strong shock, or in contact with other combustible material or even when exposed to high temperature under confinement. Contaminants (like fuel oil) may increase the explosion hazard of ammonium nitrate. Organic materials generally will make ammonium nitrate explosions more energetic. Another aspect of this accident is the railway and wagons conditions in North Korea, this aspect was caught by a very descriptive report from the Agence France Press: In North Korea, "The railway system is a symbol of the decay of the industrial sector. Defectors from North Korea say more than 90 percent of cargo and passengers in overland transportation in North Korea rely on its railways, mostly built during Japanese colonial rule over Korea in 1910-1945. The North Korean railway system uses worn-out electric trains, most of which were manufactured decades earlier and have been in service for more than 20 years. Even steam-powered trains are still in use. Overworked staff, some living on starvation rations because of the country's chronic food shortages, operate the system manually, using levers to change tracks. "Trains derail quite often as railway beds and rusting rails cannot bear the weight of freight trains," said a former North Korean railway worker who defected to South Korea and now lives in Seoul. "Railways there have many uphill and downhill tracks. Sometimes, trains fail to climb uphill, slide back and derail," said the defector Kim Yong-Hwa. Many trucks have been
converted to use charcoal for fuel as the limited gasoline supplies
are usually reserved for cars for military and government use."
Agence France Press - Relief Web Ammonium nitrate primarily is used as a fertiliser; it also is used with additives as a blasting agent and as an explosive. According to scientific literature, ammonium nitrate is a strong oxidizer and a relatively stable explosive. For the purpose of transportation, ammonium nitrate with less than 0.2 percent combustible substances and ammonium nitrate fertilisers are classified by the U.S. Department of Transportation as oxidizers. Ammonium nitrate with more than 0.2 percent combustible substances is classified as an explosive. Ammonium nitrate can be exploded under certain conditions. These must include added energy (heat, shock), especially under conditions of confinement or presence of contaminants. Although ammonium nitrate generally is used safely and normally is stable and unlikely to explode accidentally, accidental explosions of ammonium nitrate have resulted in loss of lives and destruction of property. Ammonium nitrate has a high resistance to detonation. This resistance is decreased by the presence of contaminants and/or high temperatures. Ammonium nitrata is a strong oxidizer and in contact with other material may cause fire or explosion. It may be harmful if swallowed or inhaled and causes irritation to skin, eyes and respiratory tract. Ammonium nitrate, in solid or molten form or in solution, is a stable compound and generally is difficult to explode. Ammonium nitrate may explode, however, when exposed to strong shock or to high temperature under confinement. In a large quantity of ammonium nitrate, localized areas of high temperature may be sufficiently confined by the total quantity to initiate an explosion. The explosion of a small quantity of ammonium nitrate in a confined space (e.g., a pipe) may initiate the explosion of larger quantities (e.g., in an associated vessel). Contaminants may increase the explosion hazard of ammonium nitrate. Organic materials generally will make ammonium nitrate explosions more energetic. Ammonium nitrate may be sensitized by certain inorganic contaminants, including chlorides and some metals, such as chromium, copper, cobalt, and nickel. As ammonium nitrate solution becomes more acidic, its stability decreases, and it may be more likely to explode. Low density areas, such as bubbles, in molten ammonium nitrate or solutions, also may increase the possibility of an explosion and enhance the propagation of an explosion. Ammonium nitrate by itself does not burn, but in contact with other combustible materials, it increases the fire hazard. It can support and intensify a fire even in the absence of air. Fires involving ammonium nitrate can release toxic nitrogen oxides and ammonia. A fire involving ammonium nitrate in an enclosed space could lead to an explosion. Closed containers may rupture violently when heated. These accidents rarely occur, but when they do, they have high impacts. When strongly heated, ammonium nitrate melts and decomposes releasing toxic fumes; heating of fertilisers under strong confinement (e.g. in tubes or drains) may lead to a violent reaction or explosion especially if there is contamination by certain substances like: combustible materials, reducing agents, acids, alkalis, sulphur, chlorates, chlorides, chromates, nitrites, permanganates, metallic powders and substances containing metals such as copper, nickel, cobalt, zinc and their alloys. Sources: Sources: Whitford Fertilisers
- Ammonium Nitrate MSDS; Mallinckrodt Chemicals (J. T. Baker)
- Ammonium Nitrate - MSDS; EPA - CEPPO - Chemical Safety Alert
- "Explosion Hazard From Ammonium Nitrate"; European
Fertilizer Manufacturers Association A huge explosion ripped through AZF (Azote de France) fertiliser factory in an industrial zone on the outskirts of Toulouse, southwest of France, at 10:15 am, last Friday 21 September 2001. For the moment, 31people are reported dead The total number of injuries is said to be 2,442. More than 350 people were in the plant at the time (266 AZF employees and 100 subcontractors). The explosion had occurred in a warehouse in which granular ammonium nitrate was stored flat, separated by partitions. The amount is said to be between 200 to 300 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, which is used to make fertilisers. A spokesman for the Interior Ministry in Paris ruled out a criminal attack, saying the explosion had been caused by an accident following an "incident in the handling of products". The exact cause remains unknown. AZF (formerly named ONIA) is the name under which Grande Paroisse, France's largest fertiliser manufacturer, sells its products. Grande Paroisse is owned by Atofina, the chemicals unit of TotalFinaElf - the world's fourth-biggest oil group. The AZF site is one of 1,250 factories in France classified as high-risk. The site falls under the rules of the European Union's Seveso Directive. More information on this accident can be found in this website, click here. In a 1994 accident, Terra Industries, Inc. Nitrogen Fertilizer Facility, Port Neal, Iowa, ammonium nitrate solution exploded during a manufacturing process, causing a number of deaths and injuries. In this process, ammonia and nitric acid were reacted in a neutralizer vessel to produce 83 percent ammonium nitrate solution for use in fertiliser. At the time of the accident, the neutralizer contained approximately 164,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate. During a procedure to shut down the process, compressed air was applied to the nitric acid line into the neutralizer, followed by pressurized steam at 200 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) and temperatures up to 430 o F. After the steam had passed through the nitric acid line for several hours, the ammonium nitrate exploded in the neutralizer. EPA believes localized areas of the ammonium nitrate solution were heated to high temperatures by the steam. The compressed air and steam created bubbles in the solution. The solution was highly acidic and was contaminated by chlorides. EPA believes the acidic conditions, bubbles, localized high temperatures, and chloride contamination contributed to the explosion. Another explosion occurred in 1989, during the manufacture of ammonium nitrate by a high temperature process. In this case, upset conditions allowed prolonged exposure of ammonium nitrate to temperatures up to 500 o F under high pressure and low pH (acidic). Other past accidental explosions of ammonium nitrate have included some of the most destructive on record. Several of these, including two in Oppau, Germany in 1921 occurred during attempts to break up large piles of solidified or caked ammonium nitrate-ammonium sulfate mixtures using a blasting explosive. The blasting initiated explosions in the ammonium nitrate- ammonium sulfate mixtures. Other large explosions were triggered by fires involving ammonium nitrate in confined spaces, including the 1947 explosion of two cargo ships. A fire in the hold, involving ammonium nitrate fertiliser coated with wax and stored in paper bags, caused the explosion of the first ship; the ammonium nitrate in the second ship exploded some time later, apparently as a result of a fire caused by the first explosion. This accident occured in Texas City, in Texas USA and the death toll was over 600 and more than 4,000 injuries. The accident damaged more than 90% of the city's buildings. As a result of such accidents and subsequent studies of the properties of ammonium nitrate, caked ammonium nitrate no longer is broken up with blasting agents, and wax coatings are no longer used for ammonium nitrate fertiliser. Explosions of ammonium nitrate, involving relatively small quantities, have occurred during the preparation of nitrous oxide. In these cases (e.g., an explosion in 1977), the explosions of ammonium nitrate occurred as a result of excessively high temperatures and confinement during processing. Two explosions of ammonium nitrate solutions
that occurred during processing at ordnance plants during the
Second World War were believed to be caused by the explosion of
a small amount of ammonium nitrate in a blocked pipe, which then
initiated the explosion of a larger quantity of solution.
Safe Storage and Handling Recommendations Facilities should be aware of the hazards of ammonium nitrate and ensure that the conditions that may lead to an explosion are not present. Actions that may help to prevent explosions include:
Sources: EPA - CEPPO - Chemical Safety Alert - "Explosion Hazard From Ammonium Nitrate" and Ammonium Nitrate Storage Facilities Regulations Transport Canada - National Transportation Act - Railway Act. Other references: Booklet
no. 6 of 8: Production of Ammonium Nitrate and Calcium Ammonium
Nitrate - Major Hazards - European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association Fertiliser regulations in the European Union (EU) place requirements on the quality of ammonium nitrate which is to be labelled as an EC fertiliser. Product must conform to these specifications if the plant is to qualify for BAT, which include:
AN and CAN fertilisers containing in excess of specified thresholds of ammonium nitrate are classified as oxidising substances under the UN Transport Regulations. Ammonium Nitrate declared as EC Fertiliser may only be supplied to the end user in packages. The legislation of the appropriate country must be consulted for the precise details of local requirements. Conformance to these requirements ensures that ammonium nitrate is safer for the customer. The manufacturer must select a process route that satisfies the specified limits and must also control the raw materials which are to be used (in respect of trace element analysis) to ensure that the limits are met. This also applies to anticaking and conditioning additives which are used to improve the final product. Source: Booklet
no. 6 of 8: Production of Ammonium Nitrate and Calcium Ammonium
Nitrate - Introduction -European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association UK Health and Safety Executive Storage and Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Fertilisers. (PDF) Health and Safety Executive. United Kingdom. 2001. European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association/International Fertilizer Industry Association Handbook for the Safe Storage of Ammonium Nitrate
Based Fertilizers. European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association,
Brussels. International Fertilizer Industry Association. Paris
1992. Best Available Technique Series for production
of ammonium nitrate products. European Fertilizer Manufacturers
Association, Brussels. 2000. These guidance documents can be downloaded from the website of the European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association. European Directives Council Directive 80/876/EEC of 15 July 1980
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to straight ammonium nitrate fertilizers of high nitrogen
content.Official Journal L 250, 23/09/1980 P. 0007 Π0011. UN
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. The United Nations Model Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods provide a basis for development of harmonized regulations for all modes of transport, in order to facilitate trade and the safe, efficient transport of hazardous materials. The UN Model Regulations is in its 13th edition and is the basis for most international, regional, national and modal transportation regulations. The UN Model Regulations enhance safety, improve enforcement capability, ease training requirements and enhance global trade and economic development. Safety is enhanced primarily because harmonized requirements simplify the complexity of the regulations, simplify training efforts, and decrease the likelihood of non-compliance. The Model Regulations provide economic benefits by eliminating the costs of complying with a multitude of differing national, regional and modal regulations. The UN Model Regulations facilitate compatibility between modal requirements so that a consignment may be transported by more than one mode without intermediate reclassification, marking, labeling or repackaging. Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail - COTIF The transport of passengers and goods by rail is subject to the provisions of the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail of 9 May 1990 (COTIF). This Convention has two Appendices, one dealing with the carriage of passengers (CIV Uniform Rules) and the other dealing with the carriage of goods (CIM Uniform Rules). The Office of Hazardous Materials Safety The Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, which
is within the United States Department of Transportation's Research
and Special Programs Administration, is responsible for coordinating
a national safety program for the transportation of hazardous
materials by air, rail, highway and water, where comprehensive
guidance on the subject can be found.
The guidance in this Report is applicable to
all land transport of dangerous goods by road, rail and pipeline,
as well as to the handling of such goods at interfaces with other
modes of transport, e.g. ports and airports. The guidance is intended
to supplement the provisions of national and international law
and regulations, not to replace or interfere with them. From 30 January to 1 February 2002 the Major Accident Hazard Bureau of the European Commission¡¯s Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy hosted a workshop on ammonium nitrate safety. The workshop was specifically convened to address concerns raised about current practice relative to prevention of ammonium nitrate incidents following the catastrophic incident on 21 st September at the Grande Paroisse site in Toulouse, France. The purpose of the workshop was to review current theory and practices for preventing industrial incidents involving ammonium nitrate with the view to strengthening existing technical and policy measures. The Major Accident Hazards Bureau of the European Commission Joint Research Center has made available the workshop's papers, presentations and final report on their website. For direct acess to this section click here. The UNEP APELL Programme delivered a presentation at this workshop.
All photos from BBC
News It is unacceptable that nowadays such accidents can still happen, the below listed accidents are TECHNOLOGICAL accidents with causes that are related mostly to wrong procedures and lack of preparedness, these are not NATURAL accidents where very little can be done to prevent the accident itself. The below listed accidents have taken thousands of lifes and have had dramatic impact on the lifes of people who lived in the vicinity areas of the related sites: 13 May 2000: 21 Sept 2001: 27 January 2002: 23 December 2003: 18 February 2004: Of particular concern, besides the environmental impact of such disasters, is the loss of life, impact on the health of people in the neighbourhood, and the damage and loss of property. In each of the above location people lived in close proximity to a source of potential risk, but the importance of the risk was not sufficiently considered by local authorities. UNEP's APELL Programme Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level, addresses the issues involved with such accidents. The programme was developed following the traumatic industrial accidents we experienced in the eighties, such as the methyl-isocyanate release in Bophal/India in 1984, the Basel warehouse fire 1986, and the LPG - BLEVE explosion in Mexico City in 1984.
In all the above accidents, basic APELL principles have been dismissed. It is highly recommendable to consider the adoption of the APELL process in industrialised communities in Europe and more importantly in developing countries around the World, where Directives and Legal Frameworks are missing or are not implemented. There is also a need to raise international awareness of how to safely transport Ammonium Nitrate, the industry association of Ammonium Nitrate producers can play a vital role by supporting UNEP in this effort.
Relief
web, part of the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
If you want to send us your comments, please e-mail us at: apell@unep.fr.
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TransAPELL
takes APELL guidance beyond the risks associated with fixed facilities
to include those arising from the shipping, distribution and transport
of dangerous goods. 
APELL
is an integrated approach for emergency prevention, preparedness
and response planning in close co-operation between the stakeholders
in a local community, the local authorities, and local industries.